Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist
WebStrong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple-good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure μ derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions.
Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist
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WebMay 1, 2024 · STRONG DUALITY FOR MULTIPLE-GOOD MONOPOLIST 3 and x−y 1 is continuous. Suppose instead that γis a signed Radon measure which is not positive everywhere. Then there exists a continuous nonnegative function g:X×X→R such that gdγ=−εfor some ε>0.13 Since g(xy) ≥0, it follows that −kg(xy) ≤0 ≤ x−y 1 for any k≥0. … WebStrong Duality for a Multiple Good Monopolist - YouTube Christos Tzamos, Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyComplexity and Simplicity in...
WebMay 1, 2024 · The duality is established in Dworczak and Martini (2024), under slightly stronger assumptions, using techniques from the literature on optimization with … WebJul 1, 2024 · Abstract We provide a simple proof of strong duality for the linear persuasion problem. The duality is established in Dworczak and Martini (2024), under slightly stronger assumptions, using techniques from the literature on optimization with stochastic dominance constraints and several approximation arguments.
WebAbstract. We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple-good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure $\mu$ derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions. WebSep 15, 2014 · We provide a duality-based framework for revenue maximization in a multiple-good monopoly. Our framework shows that every optimal mechanism has a certificate of optimality that takes the form of an optimal transportation map between measures. Our framework improves previous partial results, by establishing a strong …
WebJun 7, 2024 · Abstract. We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple‐good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is …
WebJan 20, 2024 · We consider a standard multiple-good monopoly setting. There is a single seller of \(d\ge 1\) goods and a single buyer. The seller’s marginal costs of production are normalized to zero. ... Tzamos, C.: Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist. Econometrica 85(3), 735–767 (2024) MathSciNet CrossRef Google Scholar ... java ubiquiti discoveryWebWe characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple‐good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure µ derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions. ... Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist: en_US: dc.type: Article ... java uatWebWe provide a duality-based framework for revenue maximization in a multiple-good monopoly. Our framework shows that every optimal mechanism has a certificate of optimality, taking the form of an optimal transportation map between measures. kuriboh cardmarketWebStrong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist Constantinos Daskalakis ⇤ EECS, MIT Alan Deckelbaum † Math, MIT Christos Tzamos ‡ EECS, MIT September 7, 2024 Abstract We … java uapWebarXiv.org e-Print archive java ua解析WebWe characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple‐good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure … java ua解析库WebJun 15, 2015 · We provide a duality-based framework for revenue maximization in a multiple-good monopoly. Our framework shows that every optimal mechanism has a … java ubl 2.1